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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from the final agency action
in formal proceedings of the Labor Commission under the Administrative Procedures Act
and Chapter 4 of the Judiciary and Judicial Administration Code. Utah Code Ann. §§
63G-4-403 (1); 78A-4-102(2)(a) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Respondents Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Workers Compensation Fund
(hereinafter, collectively, "WCF") agree with the Statement of the Issues in the Brief of
Petitioner Nancy M. Wood (hereinafter "Wood's Brief) except that WCF disagrees that
there is any need for this court to consider the Labor Commission's interpretation of the
relevant statute, which this court has already done in a previous appeal in this matter.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
The "Mental Stress as an Occupational Disease" provision, Utah Code Ann. §
34A-3-106 (2005), is set forth verbatim in Wood's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WCF agrees with the Statement of The Case in Wood's Brief except for the
following additions:
b. Course of Proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, Petitioner (hereinafter "Wood") timely filed a Motion
(Request) for Reconsideration. (R. 210-17).

c.

Disposition at Agency.

On April 28, 2009, the Appeals Board issued an Order Denying Reconsideration.
(R. 223-25).
d.

Statement of Facts.

On February 17, 1995, Wood did sustain a lumbar spine injury arising from an
industrial accident at Respondent Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Respondent Workers
Compensation Fund paid some benefits. But, in December, 2001, the parties entered into
a Compromised Settlement of Claim of Disputed Validity, which was approved by the
Labor Commission in an Order, dated December 18, 2001 (hereinafter, "Settlement
Agreement and Order"). (R. 182-87).
Specifically,

the

Settlement Agreement

and

Order provides that Wood

"permanently releases [WCF] from any and all claims . . . arising out of the accident
during the course and scope of [Wood's] employment for [Eastern Utah Broadcasting] on
or about February 17, 1995." Moreover, the order provided that no other benefits would
be paid and that the case was dismissed, with prejudice. (R. 183, 186).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although there are, admittedly, other facts that would support an opposite result,
there was substantial evidence, particularly, the opinion of the impartial medical panel,
which Wood never objected to, to support the Labor Commission's finding that Wood's
mental stress was not predominantly caused by employment exposures at Eastern Utah
Broadcasting.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT WOOD'S MEDICAL CONDITION AS A
RESULT OF MENTAL STRESS DID NOT ARISE
PREDOMINANTLY FROM EMPLOYMENT
In a previous opinion in this case, this court determined that to prevail on a
mental stress occupational disease claim under Section 34A-2-106 of the Utah Code, "the
claimant must show that the sum of all work related stress is greater than the sum of all
non-work related stress." Eastern Utah Broadcasting v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT
App 99,11 9, 158 P.3d 1115, 1118 (hereinafter WoodII). Based upon this construction of
Section 34A-1-106 in Wood'II, the Appeals Board found that Wood's work related stress
was not predominant. There is substantial evidence to support this finding.
Wood has properly marshalled the evidence in support of the Appeals Board
finding; however, Wood is incorrect in her argument that such evidence was inadequate
because the Appeals Board considered non-work exposures in its evaluation when, in
fact, some of those exposures were at least partially work related.
It is true that Wood had an industrial accident with the same employer in 1995 that
caused injury to her lumbar spine and that the medical panel and the Appeals Board
considered Wood's ongoing pain in her low back as a non-work contributor to her mental
stress. But, due to Wood's release of all her claims related to her low back and, based
upon that, the Labor Commission's dismissal of her low back claim, with prejudice,
Wood is precluded from now claiming that her low back pain should be considered as

3

work related in her claim for occupational disease mental stress. This court so held in
Acosta v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 2004 UT App 411 (hereinafter, "Acosta
IF)} Thus, as a matter of law, Wood's low back injury is non-work related.
In Acosta II, Ms. Acosta had first filed an Application for Hearing to recover
workers compensation benefits for industrial accident for a low back injury she sustained
while at work engaged in lifting an infant. The Labor Commission denied Ms. Acosta's
claim because she had a preexisting low back condition which, although asymptomatic,
contributed to her injury, and the lifting of the infant did not meet the higher legal
causation standard set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
On appeal, this court affirmed the Labor Commission's denial of benefits, reasoning that
even if the preexisting condition was asymptomatic, the legal causation test of Allen still
applies. Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, Y|[ 20-27, 44 P.3d 819, 824-26
(hereinafter Acosta I).
After this court's decision in Acosta I, Ms. Acosta filed another Application for
Hearing, claiming that her low back injury was the result of an occupational disease, in
addition to being an industrial accident. The Labor Commission dismissed the case as
precluded by res judicata.

On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal, applying the

claim preclusion branch of res judicata, which "arises when (i) 'the same parties' (ii)
present a claim that was or that 'could and should have been raised' in a previous suit,
and (iii) the previous suit 'resulted in a final judgment.'" Acosta II, at •fl 2. This court

1

Since this decision is unpublished, it is included in the Addendum. Utah R. App. P.
30(f).
4

affirmed the Labor Commission's dismissal, reasoning that Ms. Acosta5s occupational
disease claim met all three criteria and, in particular, could and should have been brought
when she filed the claim for industrial accident.2 Id., at \ 8.
In this case, as in Acosta II, the industrial accident case and this case involve the
same parties and there was a final judgment of dismissal of the industrial accident case,
with prejudice.
This case is different from Acosta II because Wood is not directly attempting to
reopen her industrial accident case as an occupational disease, but the reasoning of
Acosta II still applies because by now alleging that the lumbar pain was caused by the
1995 industrial accident, Wood is indirectly attempting to circumvent her release of all
claims related to that accident by alleging it contributed to her mental stress occupational
disease. In Acosta II, this court reasoned that "claims are 'identical5 if the two causes of
action rest on the same 'state of facts' and the same kind of evidence is '"necessary to
sustain the two causes of action.'55" Id., at ^ 4 (quoting Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,
1340 (Utah 1983)). Here, the fact that the 1995 accident was originally an industrial
accident is necessary to Wood's argument that the low back pain is non-work related.
Since now, by virtue of the release and order of dismissal with prejudice, the low back

The parties did not dispute that Ms. Acosta's claim met "the same parties and the final
judgment requirements" of claim preclusion res judicata. Id. at ^ 3.
Wood may argue that, since there was a settlement, there was never a final judgment
"on the merits"; however, this case is different than a typical settlement of a civil suit in
that the settlement was required to be, and was, approved by the Labor Commission
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(4) (2005). See, Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v.
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601,621 (Utah 1983).
5

pain is no longer industrial as a matter of law, Wood's argument that the low back pain is
work related is contrary to the reasoning of Acosta II.
Wood next argues that her headaches are also, at least partially, work related.
Although Dr. Mooney does state that the headaches may be the result of stress, he does
not specifically address the source of the stress when stating this. More importantly, Dr.
Morgan's opinion is that the headaches are a result of the stress, not a cause of it. Wood
admits that, except as it apparently relates to the viral meningitis that is she admits is nonwork related, the medical panel also does not consider the headaches, whatever the cause,
as a cause of the mental stress.
Wood next argues that her husband's disability and the fact that she had her son
living with her should not be considered as causes of her mental stress because they are
not mentioned in or supported by the medical record, only by the Administrative Law
Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"), in her findings. Wood cites no specific legal authority for her
proposition that the presence or absence of stressors can only be established by medical
evidence.

Anyone living in today's society is capable, without resort to a medical

professional, of discerning that certain given circumstances can cause stress. Therefore,
just because no medical professionals, including the medical panel, discussed these
stressors it does not mean that the Appeals Board could not appropriately consider them.
Moreover, even if medical evidence is necessary to establish a given stressor, as will be
argued below, of the stressors the medical panel did consider, it still concluded that the
work related stressors did not predominate over the non-work related stressors.

6

Wood argues that the Appeals Board could not appropriately rely upon the medical
panel opinion because the medical panel did not consider whether the stressors arose
from Wood's employment or not, only whether Wood's then current condition was
attributable to work or non-work related exposures. As stated above, in Wood II, this
court specifically held that "the claimant must show that the sum of all non-work related
stress is greater than the sum of all non-work related stress." Wood II, at ^[ 9. There is no
mention of arise or when this comparison should be made. Wood is asking the court to
engage in an exercise in semantics in any event. Moreover, if Wood believed that the
medical panel considered the wrong point in time, or, as Wood also argued, considered
work related stress as non-work related (e.g., low back pain), in its comparison, she could
have objected to the medical panel report on that basis. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2601(2)(d) (Supp. 2009); (R. 55).

Or, when the ALJ entered her Preliminary

Determination of Permanent Total Disability and Order, wherein she adopted the
conclusions of the medical panel to determine that 50% of Wood's disability was workrelated (R. 70, 73, 76), she could have filed a Motion for Review disputing that finding.
Wood did neither and, under fundamental principles of appellate review, should not be
now allowed to raise those protestations of error by the medical panel, ALJ or Appeals
Board. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 9,17 P.3d 1122, 1124; hunt v. Lance,
2008 UT App 192,ffif23, 24 ,186 P.3d 978, 986; Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, %
17, 38P.3d307, 313.
Wood's next argument is that the opinion of Dr. Mooney does not support the
Appeals Board decision. Admittedly, Dr. Mooney's report is somewhat equivocal. Even
7

so, his opinions, when taken in conjunction with the other substantial evidence the
Appeals Board relied upon, does support the Appeals Board decision. Additionally, even
if Dr. Mooney's report is entirely disregarded, the fact remains that the medical panel
report unequivocally concludes that only half of Wood's mental stress is work-related.
The standard of review does not require that this court do a balancing of the evidence,
only determine whether there is "'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion/" Bradley v. Payson
City Corp., 2003 UT 16, \ 15, 70 P.3d 47, 52 (quoting First National Bank v. County
Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)). Therefore, since the medical
panel was the only impartial medical professionals to opine on the issue of the amount of
work related stress as compared to non-work related stress, it is difficult to conceive of a
more reasonable basis for the Appeals Board's conclusion.
Since the medical panel report alone is substantial evidence to support the Appeals
Board decision, it is superfluous for the court to consider the "other credible evidence"
that Wood presents for consideration, no matter how compelling that evidence may be.
To do so would circumvent the clear standard of review set forth above.

8

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should affirm the Order on Remand
from the Utah Court of Appeals, dated January 21, 2009.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 2009.

Floyd $f Holm, Attorney for Petitioners
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the 30th day of November, 2009, true and correct copies of
the attached Brief of Respondents Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Workers
Compensation Fund in the Nancy M. Wood matter, Appellate Case No. 20090440, Labor
Commission Case No. 2001208, was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following:

Alan Hennebold
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Jay Barnes, Esq.
Law Office of Jay Barnes
P. O. Box 2455
Orem, Utah 84059-2455
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ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION

A

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

NANCY WOOD,

1

Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION

vs.
EASTERN UTAH BROADCASTING and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 01-0208

Respondents.

Nancy Wood asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior
decision denying Mrs. Wood's claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, Title
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 63G-4-302 of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
This matter arises from Mrs. Wood claim for occupational disease benefits for anxiety
disorder allegedly caused by mental stressfromher employment by Eastern Utah Broadcasting.] The
Appeals Board previously determined that Ms. Wood's work-related stress does not predominate
over her non-work stresses. For that reason, the Appeals Board concluded that Mrs. Wood's
employment at Eastern Utah Broadcasting is the not the legal cause of her anxiety disorder and that
she is not entitled to occupational disease benefits.
Mrs. Wood now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Specifically, Mrs. Wood
argues that the evidence establishes that her work-related stress did, in fact, predominate over her
non-work stresses.
DISCUSSION
Having reviewed the argument raised in Mrs. Wood's request for reconsideration in light of
the evidence of record, the Appeals Board remains convinced that Mrs. Wood's work-related stress
did not predominate over her non-work stresses. The Appeals Board's previous decision discusses in
some detail the factual basis for the Board's determination—particularly the opinion of the impartial
medical panel. The Appeals Board therefore reaffirms its previous decision in this matter,
- The legal and procedural history relating to Mrs. Wood's claim has been set forth in the previous
decisions of the Appeals Board and the Utah Court of Appeals and will not be repeated here.

\ '

* M

\f^i

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
NANCY WOOD
PAGE 2 OF 3
ORDER
The Appeals Board denies Mrs, Wood's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this „$

day of April, 2009.

Colleen Colton, Chair

"kjjU^J

^l0M^

Patricia S. Drawe

DISSENT
For the reasons stated in my dissent to the Appeals Board's majority decision of January 21,
2009, I would grant Mrs. Wood's request for reconsideration and remand her claim to the
administrative law judge for further evidentiary proceedings on the question of whether Mrs. Wood's
work-related stress predominates over her personal non-work stresses.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
NANCY WOOD
PAGE 3 OF 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Reconsideration^in the matter of Nancy
Wood, Case No. 01-0208, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this <£$ day of April, 2009, to the
following:
Nancy Wood
4476E2750 S
Price UT 84501
Eastern Utah Broadcasting
1899Carbonville
Price UT 84501
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160E300S
P O Box 146611
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Bradford Myler, Esq.
P O Box 127
LehiUT 84.043
Floyd Holm, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
392 E 6400 S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

yck/ik. huh*.itK»froJ
Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

COMPROMISED SETTLEMENT OF CLAIM OF DISPUTED VALIDITY
(AND ORDER)

OVvC

•^ 5 ^Wb

Floyd W Holm #1522
Attorney for Respondents
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
(801)288-8059
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH

NANCY M. WOOD
File No/
Inj.Date;

1995-07141-L2
02-17-95

*
*
*
*
•

Petitioner

*
*
*

vs.
EASTERN UTAH BROADCAST
and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

COMPROMISED SETTLEMENT
OF CLAIM OF DISPUTED
VALIDITY

Case #2001209

*
*
*

Respondents

Petitioner Nancy M. Wood (hereinafter "Petitioner") and Respondents Eastern Utah
Broadcast (hereinafter "Employer") and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF7)
hereby stipulate and agree that the above-referenced matter maybe compromised, settled and
discharged pursuant to the following terms and conditions:
FACTS
1.
Petitioner was involved in an industrial accident during the course and scope of
her employment with Employer on February 17, 1995. Petitioner is currently 52 years of age,
2.

WCF was the workers compensation insurance carrier for Employer on February 17,

1995.
3.
After an investigation into the facts surrounding the Petitioner's industnal
accident, a dispute has arisen between Petitioner and Employer as to whether or not Petitioner i$
entitled to additional benefits under the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Act

87/83/2007

13:27
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of Utah, Section 34A-1401, et seq, Utah Code Annotated, The specifics of the dispute are set
forth as
follows:
*• >
•
A.

Petitioner alleges that while carrying mail iram'tJie post office to her place of
employment she slipped and fell on a gravel road, injuring her lower back,

B.

Petitioner claims that due to the above-described injury she has sustained medical
expenses and time lost from work.

C.

Respondents claim that they have already paid fall benefits m relation to Petitioner's
accident on February 17,1995, that she has reached maximum improvement and
that there are no additional reasonable and necessary medical expenses or disability
as the result of such accident.

D.

Respondents further claim that Applicant's claims for medical expenses related to
the accident may be barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations.

E.

Rather than continue the dispute the parties feel it in their best interests to enter
into the following final and binding settlement.

SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE
Based upon the foregoing, the parties agree as follows:
1.
In consideration of the payment to Petitioner of the sums set forth in this
document, Petitioner permanently releases Employer, and/or WCF from any and all claims and
pursuant to the Workers7 Compensation and Occupational Disease Act of Utah arising out of the
accident during the course and scope of Petitioner^ employment for Employer on or about
February 17,1995.
2.
In exchange for the foregoing release, WCF agrees, on behalf of Employer5 s
workers compensation policy, as follows:
a.
To pay a lump sum amount of $7750(100 (seven thousand five hundred
dollars and no cents) directly to Petitioner, less $1,500.00 (one thousand five hundred and no
cents) paid out in a separate check to Bradford D. Myler, Petitioner's attorney, for a net amount.
paid to Petitioner of $6,000,00 (six thousand dollars and no cents). Said sum represents
compensation at the rate of $3,49 per week for Petitioner's current life expectancy of 33.08 years.
b.
To be forever barred and estopped from in any way claiming that
Petitioner's industrial accident of February 17, 1995 in any way caused or contributed to
Petitioner's permanent total disability, if any. This settlement is for t h < ^ g | ^ related to the injury
of February 17,1995. She still has an ongoing occupational disease cialnrwhich is not affected
by the settlement.1'

'
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3.
Petitioner declares that she understands that the injuries sustained may be
permanent and progressive and that recovery thereirom iz uncertain and indefinite, hi making
this release and agreement, the Petitioner relies wholly upon her own judynent, belief, and
knowledge of the nature and extent and duration of said injuries or damages, and that she has not
been influenced to any extent whatever in making this release by any representations or
statements regarding said injuries, or regarding any othe: matters, made by the persons, firms, or
corporations who are released or by any person or persons representing the released parties, or by
any physician or surgeon employed by the released parties.
4.
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a
doubtful and disputed claim; that the issue in dispute is that of Petitioner's cooperation and the
continued compensability of the Petitioner's injury under the provisions of the Workers'
Compensation and Occupational Disease Act of Utah; and that the payments to be made by
Employer hereunder are not to be construed in any way as an admission of liability for the
payment of additional workers' compensation benefits on the part of Employer, by whom
liability for such benefits is expressly denied.
5.
This release contains the entire agreement between the parties. The terms of this
release are contractual and not a mere recital They are intended as a final and binding
settlement, not subject to future modification or novation except upon subsequent written
agreement between the parties. Petitioner further states that she has carefully read the foregoing
release and knows the contents and after having conferred with legal counsel, signs the same of
her own free act. In witness of the same, Petitioner has reviewed and signed the attached
Disclosure Statement as required by the Labor Commission of Utah,
The parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement becomes binding and effective upon
approval of the Labor Commission of Utah.
£
Dated this ft> day of T>fc&e**^» 2001

Dated this \V ^day of

Dated this &

day of

1)^£*W£A

, 2001

/fecc^k-. 2001
Floyd i^fciolm, Attorney for
Respondents
^

Dated this j$

day of kaAJUrUUs^ 2001

MJL<

*d$ i

ihda Duvall, Mediator
Labor Commission

07/03/2007
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1.
I understand that all unpaid medical bills will be paid by me and not by Employer
and/or WCF and that the $7,500.00 (seven thousand five hundred dollars and no cents) lump sum
settlement will be paid to me to cover future medical expeoses and any claims for disability
compensation related to the accident of February 17, 1995.
2.

I understand that this a full and final settlement.

3.
I understand that this is all the money I will ever receive as the result of my
industrial accident that occurred while working for Employer on or about February 17,1995.
4.
I understand that in accepting this settlement, I am giving up the right to an
administrative hearing at the Labor Commission, in which an Administrative Law Judge could give
mc more money, less money or no money.
5.
I understand that even if my current medical condition becomes more serious, or if I
develop new medical problems from this condition in the future, I cannot come back and ask for
more money.
6.
My decision to settle this case is my own. No one has placed any pressure on me or
has influenced this decision, I am presently free from the influence of drugs or alcohol that could
otherwise impair my judgment; in signing this settlement,
7.

It is my desire that the Administrative Law Judge approve this settlement.

KI

pm^x

if)

U

I Petitiotier's Signature

Date

O&DER
Based upon the foregoing Compromised Settlement of Chdm of Disputed Validity, is hereby
ordered as follows:
1.
It is ordered that the claim for Workers Compensation and/or Occupational
Disease benefits made by Nancy M. Wood against Eastern Utah Broadcast, for injuries caused by
an industrial accident occurring on or about February 17,1995, be settled on a disputed validity
basis.
2.
as follows:

The Workers Compensation Fund, on behalf of Eastern Utah Broadcast is ordered

a.
To pay a lump sum amount of $7,500.00 (seven thousand five hundred
dollars and no cents) directly to Petitioner, less $ 1,500,00 (one thousandfivehundred and no
cents) paid out in a separate check to Bradford D. Myler, Petitioner's attorney, for a net amount
paid to Petitioner of $6,000.00 (six thousand dollars and no cents). Said sum represents
compensation at the rate of S3.49 per week for Petitioner's current life expectancy of 33.08 years.
h
To be forever barred and estopped from in any way claiming that
Petitioner's industrial accident of February 17,1995 in anyway caused or contributed to
Petitioner's permanent total disability, if any.
3.

No other benefits shall be paid other than those set forth above,

4.
It is ordered that the Labor Commission ratifies this agreement to the extent that
its jurisdiction allows.
5.

The case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

^L^

Approved this / ^ day of / i T O K ^ O Q l
by the Labor Commission of Utah.

Juftge Debbie L^Hann
Administrative Law Judge

5
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MAILING CERTIFK ATE
^v^
'£uLej^*J*>£*- N
I hereby certify that on the p'l__ day of November, 2001,. a true and correct copy of Settlement of
Disputed Validity regarding Nancy M Wood was mailed postage prepaid to the following
parties:

Floyd WHota
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Attorney for Respondents
Workers Compensation Fund

^Bradford' Myler
Attorney at Law
1441 South 550 East
Orem, Utah 84097

Nancy M. Wood
4476 East 2750 South
Price, Utah 84501
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OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Original Proceeding in this Court.
JACKSON, Judge:
[^[1] Linda Acosta appeals because the
Labor Commission (Commission) dismissed
her occupational
disease
claim
as
precluded by res judicata. We affirm.
[^|2]The res judicata doctrine has two
branches, one of which is claim preclusion. See Maoris & Assocs.
v. Neways,
Inc.,
2000 UT 93, P19, 16 P. 3d
1214.
"Generally, claim preclusion bars a
party from prosecuting in a subsequent
action a claim that has been fully
litigated previously." Massey v.
Board

of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty.
Action
Comm. , Inc.,
2004 UT App 27, PS, 86 P. 3d
120 (citing Miller
v. USAA Cas. Ins.
Co.,
2002 UT 6, P58, 44 P. 3d 663) (quotations
and other citations omitted). Claim
preclusion arises when (i) "the same
parties"
[*2]
(ii) present a claim
that was or that "could and should have
been raised" in a previous suit, and
(iii) the previous suit "resulted in a
final judgment. " Miller,
2002 UT 6 at P58
(quotations and citations omitted).
tl3]The parties do not dispute that
this case meets the same parties and the
final judgment requirements. Thus, at
issue here is whether the occupational
disease claim was or could and should
have been raised in a previous suit. We
review the trial court's determination
that res judicata bars an action for
correctness. See Maoris,
2000 UT 93 at
PI 7.
[^4]First, Acosta argues that the
workers'
compensation
claim was a
distinct claim from the industrial
accident claim because it arose from
separate statutes with different requirements and compensation. For res
judicata purposes, though, claims are
"identical" if the two causes of action
rest on the same "state of facts" and the
same kind of evidence " ' is necessary to
sustain the two causes of action. ' " Id.
at P28 (quoting Schaer v. State,
657 P. 2d
1337,

1340

(Utah

1983))

. Acosta» s claims

are the same in that they both involve an
injury to her lower back, rely on the same
medical [*3]
records, and stem from the
same employment. Additionally, both
claims allege an injury that initially
produced symptoms at the same time. The
fact that Acosta now depends upon a

different legal theory is unpersuasive.
The "state of facts" and evidence underlying the claim, not the legal bases,
are relevant to the identity of the
claim. Id.
[^5] Second, Acosta argues that she
could not have filed the claims together
because the Commission used different
forms for the two actions. However, a
claimant may state alternative grounds
for a claim. See, e.g.,
Utah R. Civ. P.
18. Additionally, the administrative law
judges of the Commission adjudicate all
matters brought under the Utah Labor
Code.
See
Utah
Code
Ann.
§
34A-1-302(1)(a)
(2001). Thus, Acosta
could have asserted the occupational
disease claim as an alternative ground in
the workers' compensation claim, and the
claim would have been heard by the same
administrative law judge who heard the
workers' compensation claim.
[^[6] Next, Acosta argues that (i) the
Commission did not analyze the "should
have" requirement; (ii) the governing
acts, the Occupational Disease Act and
the Workers' Compensation Act, [*4] do
not require a claimant to bring claims
simultaneously; and (iii) the Commission's practice of allowing alternative
claims was permissive not mandatory.
Thus, Acosta argues, she had no duty to
bring the claims together. Contrary to
Acosta's argument, the Commission did
analyze the "should have" requirement.
Even if the statutes do not require that
claims be brought together, res judicata
precludes a claimant from pursuing a
claim "through piecemeal litigation,
offering one legal theory to the court
while holding others in reserve for
future litigation." American
Estate
Mgmt. v. International
Inv. & Dev.
Corp.,
1999 UT App 232,
P14,
986 P. 2d 765
(quotations and citations omitted).

Thus, because the facts and evidence
necessary to present and defend these
claims substantially overlap, Acosta
should have brought the claims together.
\\l\ Lastly, Acosta argues that public
policy requires the Commission to award
compensation to her because the policy
behind the Workers' Compensation Act
should override a technical hurdle such
as claim preclusion. While workers'
compensation indeed serves important
public interests, claim preclusion does
also. See id. at P6. The important [*5]
interests underlying claim preclusion
should not be ignored.
tf8]In sum, claim preclusion bars
Acosta's occupational disease claim
because the same parties present a claim
that is identical, in fact and evidence,
to a previous claim. Acosta could and
should have brought the occupational
disease claim together with the workers •
compensation claim, and the previous
claim resulted in a final judgment. Thus,
the Commission
correctly
dismissed
Acosta's occupational disease claim as
barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we
affirm. 1
1
In light of our decision to
affirm the dismissal, we need not
reach the argument of Respondent
American
Manufacturers
Mutual
Insurance that it did not insure
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
during the time in which Acosta was
injured.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding
Judge

